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Background: Exclusions are used by insurers to neutralize higher than average risks of sickness absence (SA).
However, differentiating risk groups according to one’s medical situation can be seen as discrimination against
people with health problems in violation of a 2006 United Nations convention. The objective of this study is to
investigate whether the risk of SA of insured persons with exclusions added to their insurance contract differs
from the risk of persons without exclusions. Methods: A dynamic cohort of 15 632 applicants for private disability
insurance at a company insuring only college and university educated self-employed in the Netherlands. Mean
follow-up was 8.94 years. Duration and number of SA periods were derived from insurance data to calculate the
hazard of SA periods and of recurrence of SA periods. Results: Self-employed with an exclusion added to their
insurance policy experienced a higher hazard of one or more periods of SA and on average more SA days than self-
employed without an exclusion. Conclusion: Persons with an exclusion had a higher risk of SA than persons
without an exclusion. The question to what extent an individual should benefit from being less vulnerable to
disease and SA must be addressed in a larger societal context, taking other aspects of health inequality and
solidarity into account as well.
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Introduction
In modern society, insurers provide a valuable social function inshifting, spreading and reducing risks.1 Therefore, accessibility and
affordability of insurance are of great importance. Over the past
years, private insurance companies have been met with growing
criticism regarding risk selection practices, allegedly leading to
unfair discrimination. Risk rating is thought to lead to discrimin-
ation of groups with chronic conditions.2 A person’s health is
usually perceived as being influenced by a range of social and
genetic factors, over which the person has limited or no control.
Excluding people based on their health is seen as unethical by
many.3 However, the fundamental rule that applies to all
insurance products is that the premiums paid are appropriate to
the risk of future claims.4,5 Thus risk classification based on
medical underwriting lies at the core of most of these health-
related voluntary insurance policies.6
Until now, most concern regarding risk stratification based on
medical information has focused on life insurance and genetic in-
formation. However, other forms of insurance, e.g. disability
insurance and risk factors other than genetic information such as
past medical history are equally important and deserve just as much
attention to prevent unfair discrimination.7,8
When applying for private disability insurance, the risk of future
claims is estimated by evaluating the current health status and the
medical history of the applicant. Possible forms of risk management
at application stage are a longer waiting period before a benefit is
paid (longer deferment period), limited duration of the insurance
contract, extra premium or in case of an excessive risk even rejection
of the insurance application. If a specific condition substantially
increases the risk of claims being made, an exclusion can be added
to neutralize this risk, i.e. the insured will not be entitled to a benefit
if sickness absence (SA) is caused by the condition specified in the
exclusion.4,9 Internationally, exclusions are a frequently used
method of risk management in disability insurance.4,9 In a survey
among Dutch self-employed 8% of those insured had an exclusion
added to their insurance policy.10
Only two studies have attempted to evaluate this practice of risk
neutralization. Wildhagen et al.11 performed a case-control study in
an exclusively male population comparing insured with and without
exclusions. They found that insured without an exclusion claimed
benefits less often than those with an exclusion. No significant
difference in the length of the SA between those with and those
without an exclusion was found.11 Hamilton et al.12 studied risk
factors for insurance claims in a case-control study comparing
claimants and non-claimants from a disability insurance company.
In contrast to the findings of the previously mentioned study they
found no relation between claims and exclusions.12
Thus knowledge regarding risk estimation and neutralization at
application for private disability insurance is scarce, is based on
limited evidence and is contradictory, leaving a considerable
knowledge gap. The aim of this study is, therefore, to investigate
whether the risk of SA of insured persons with exclusions added to
their insurance contract differs from the risk of persons without
exclusions.
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Methods
Design and study population
This study is based on a dynamic cohort of 15 868 applicants for
private disability insurance at a company insuring college and
university educated self-employed, e.g. doctors, lawyers or dentists,
in the Netherlands. All applicants who applied for a new insurance
policy with a waiting period of 30 days before the insurance
company starts paying benefits and were accepted for insurance
cover between 1 January 1993 and 1 January 2010 were included.
Only those applicants whose insurance contracts ran for at least 18
consecutive months were included. Applicants whose insurance
contracts ran for <18 consecutive months were excluded from our
study as follow-up would have been very short and it is doubtful
whether persons leaving self-employment after a short period can be
thought of as representative for the population of self-employed
needing disability insurance.
Ethical clearance was sought from the Medical Ethics Committee
of the University Medical Centre Groningen, which advised that,
according to Dutch law, ethical approval was not required for this
study. As administrative data was used, under Dutch law no
informed consent was needed.
Study variables
The following data were collected retrospectively from the files at the
insurance company: date of birth, profession, gender, the existence
of one or more exclusions and the period during which the exclusion
was in effect, the nature of the exclusion and information on periods
of SA of 30 days or more.
Exclusions can be temporary, e.g. when accurate estimation of the
risk at application is not possible. Especially when a health
complaint has only recently emerged, often more time is needed
to evaluate the course of this risk factor or illness. In these cases,
the exclusions are combined with a right to re-assessment after a
fixed period of time; most often 3 or 5 years. In general, these
exclusions can be ended if at re-assessment the risk of SA due to
the health complaint is estimated to be no higher than in the general
population. Exclusions can also later be applied to the insurance
policy if an applicant increases the amount insured during the
follow-up time. A new risk assessment is then performed and for
the additional amount insured an exclusion can be added.
The following groups were distinguished:
Group A: persons that had never had any exclusion added to their
insurance policy during the follow-up period (reference group).
Group B: persons with one or more exclusions that ran during the
whole follow-up period. We distinguished the following exclusion
categories: mental and behavioural disorders, cardiovascular
disorders, musculoskeletal disorders, pregnancy-related disorders
other exclusions and ‘multiple exclusions’, i.e. more than one
exclusion at the same time. When only one exclusion ran at the
same time but during the study period exclusions from different
disease categories followed each other, the exclusion that ran for
the longest period was coded as the category for the whole period
of exclusion.
Lastly, two groups were distinguished whose exclusions ran for part
of the follow-up. In these cases, the first and the last date the exclusion
was effective was extracted from the insurance company files.
Group C had an exclusion from the start that ended during the
follow-up period.
Group D had an exclusion that was added to the insurance
contract during the follow-up period.
Information was collected on the number of periods of SA, on the
first and the last day of SA and on the causes of SA. As the shortest
possible waiting period for the insurance company studied is 30 days,
only periods of SA of 30 days or more were included in our study. SA
was assessed in relation to the insured’s own work by the insurance
company physician using medical information from treating
physicians and self-report data. No distinction was made between
partial and full SA. Length of SA was calculated from the number
of calendar days an insured worker received a benefit. Full return to
work in this study was defined as the end of the claim with the
insurance company. Maternity leave for normal pregnancies was
excluded, however, pregnancy-related SA was included. The
following categories of diagnoses were distinguished: mental and
behavioural disorders, cardiovascular disorders, musculoskeletal
disorders, pregnancy-related disorders and other causes of SA. Data
on SA periods were checked for inconsistencies and overlapping and
directly consecutive periods were combined. In combined periods of
SA, the cause that was the reason for most days of absence was coded
as the cause of the total period. Follow-up ended when an insured
person ended the insurance policy or on 1 July 2011.
Statistical analyses
To describe the sample characteristics, we calculated numbers and
percentages for categorical variables and means, percentiles (pctl)
and SD’s for continuous variables in SPSS 19. The statistical
package R3.01 was used to examine the hazard of SA periods and
of recurrence of SA for the four different exclusion groups.13 In these
analyses, the Andersen–Gill extension of the Cox proportional
hazards model was used to allow for the recurrent nature of the
event studied; here periods of SA.14
The four groups were then compared regarding the number of
sick days using general linear models with resulting 95% confidence
intervals (CIs) based on 1000 bootstrap samples. Analyses were
conducted for all SA periods regardless of relation to the exclusion
and for SA periods that were unrelated to the exclusion separately.
Gender, occupation and age at the start of the follow-up were added
to the statistical models to examine whether these variables could
explain possible differences between the four groups.
Results
Descriptives of the sample
Table 1 presents demographic variables of the applicants included in
our study in relation to the exclusions. A total of 15 632 insured
persons contributed 139 786 person years to the study. Almost 60%
of the sample were male and the mean age at the start of the follow-
up was 35.09 years. The sample consisted of higher educated self-
employed (legal professions, general practitioners, other medical
doctors/specialists, dentists or orthodontists, paramedic professions,
technical professions, financial services, pharmacists, veterinarians
and midwives) (data not shown).
Of the sample, 12 997 applicants (83.1%) never had an exclusion
added to the insurance contract (group A), and 1756 persons (11.2%)
had an exclusion during the whole follow-up period (group B).
The remainder of the sample (N = 879) had an exclusion that was
in effect for part of the follow-up period, of which 422 (2.7%) had an
exclusion from the start of their insurance contract that ended during
the follow-up (group C) and 457 (2.9%) persons had an exclusion
added to their insurance policy at a later stage (group D). In total,
5582 periods of SA occurred during the follow-up. Of these, 132
periods of SA were related to the exclusion present at that time. In
our sample, 11 865 individuals experienced no SA.
Table 2 presents an overview of the different exclusion groups
according to the nature of the exclusion in our sample. Exclusions
for musculoskeletal disorders were most frequent in our sample but
persons with exclusions for mental and behavioural disorders
presented the highest number of sick days.
Tables 3 and 4 present the hazard ratios (HRs) for periods of SA
and also the duration of SA in the different groups. Table 3
summarizes our findings for all periods of SA. Overall tests for
periods (P < 0.001) and duration of SA (P < 0.001) showed statistically
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significant differences between the four groups. Persons with an
exclusion during the entire follow-up period presented a statistically
significantly higher hazard of SA compared with persons without an
exclusion (HR = 1.29; 95% CI: 1.19–1.40). The insured persons who
had an exclusion that ended during follow-up showed a similar
hazard while the persons who had an exclusion added to their
insurance contract during the follow-up period showed a somewhat
higher hazard (HR = 1.65; 95% CI: 1.48–1.84). The groups with
exclusions also had a longer duration of SA than the group without
exclusions (only statistically significant between group A and B),
except for the group that had an exclusion added after the start
of the study. For SA unrelated to the exclusion similar but
somewhat attenuated associations were found. Potential explanatory
factors (gender, occupation and age at start follow-up) explained only
part of the associations between the exclusions and the occurrence
of SA.
Table 2 Exclusion groups and exclusion categories and total number of SA periods
N (%) Group B Group C Group D Mean SA (days) 95 pctl 99 pctl
Mental and behavioural disorders 299 (1.9%) 155 (8.8%) 104 (24.6%) 40 (8.8%) 299.17 2090.00 5289.00
Cardiovascular disorders 191 (1.2%) 114 (6.5%) 46 (10.9%) 31 (6.8%) 246.53 2164.80 4651.36
Musculoskeletal disorders 708 (4.5%) 494 (28.1%) 102 (24.2%) 112 (24.5%) 288.03 2118.10 4578.07
Pregnancy-related disorders 112 (0.7%) 69 (3.9%) 17 (4.0%) 26 (5.7%) 170.22 745.50 3984.95
Other exclusions 963 (6.2%) 653 (37.2%) 130 (30.8%) 180 (39.4%) 185.57 871.60 4272.76
Multiple exclusions 362 (2.3%) 271 (15.4%) 23 (5.5%) 68 (14.9%) 246.38 1919.70 4180.35
Total 1756 (100%) 422 (100%) 457 (100%) 183.57 941.00 4076.68
Group A: never exclusion (reference group).
Group B: exclusion whole follow-up.
Group C: exclusion from start but ended.
Group D: exclusion added after start follow-up.
Table 1 Descriptives of the sample N=15632
Total sample
(N = 15 632)
Group A Group B Group C Group D
Gender: Men (N, %) 9304 (59.5%) 7804 (60.0%) 1027 (58.5%) 227 (53.8%) 246 (53.8%)
Mean age at start follow-up (SD) 35.09 (6.13) 35.03 (6.11) 35.97 (6.38) 35.05 (5.75) 33.40 (5.83)
Mean follow-up in years (SD) 8.94 (5.00) 8.87 (5.03) 8.10 (4.60) 11.35 (4.35) 11.95 (4.43)
0 SA periods (N) 10 036 (77.2%) 1305 (74.3%) 270 (64.0%) 254 (55.6%)
1 SA period (N) 2054 (15.8%) 312 (17.8%) 105 (24.9%) 117 (25.6%)
2 SA periods (N) 595 (4.6%) 90 (5.1%) 28 (6.6%) 50 (10.9%)
3 SA periods (N) 206 (1.6%) 31 (1.8%) 13 (3.1%) 21 (4.6%)
4 or more SA periods (N) 106 (0.8%) 18 (1.0%) 6 (1.4%) 15 (3.3%)
Total 12 997 (100%) 1756 (100%) 422 (100%) 457 (100%)
Group A: never exclusion (reference group).
Group B: exclusion whole follow-up.
Group C: exclusion from start but ended.
Group D: exclusion added after start follow-up.
SA, absence; SD, standard deviation.
Table 3 Hazard rates and total duration of SA for all SA periods
All SA HR all SA 95% CI HR all SA 95% CI
Unadjusted Adjusteda,
Group A 1 1
Group B 1.29 1.19–1.40 1.18 1.08–1.28
Group C 1.26 1.10–1.44 1.22 1.07–1.40
Group D 1.65 1.48–1.84 1.57 1.41–1.76
Duration all SA 95% CI Duration all SA 95% CI
Unadjusted Adjusted
Group A 174.95 164.33–186.57 307.17 270.44–341.06
Group B 245.74 211.78–279.81 338.99 294.74–383.94
Group C 213.15 133.46–299.29 343.29 262.24–431.70
Group D 162.73 104.33–229.10 323.11 258.22–396.36
Group A: never exclusion (reference group).
Group B: exclusion whole follow-up.
Group C: exclusion from start but ended.
Group D: exclusion added after start follow-up.
SA, sickness absence; CI, confidence interval. aAdjusted for gender, occupation, age at start follow-up. Overall P values < 0.001. Overall P
values = 0.150.
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Discussion and conclusions
Main findings
In this study, we found that self-employed with an exclusion added
to their insurance policy experienced a higher hazard of one or more
periods of SA and on average more sick days than self-employed
without an exclusion. This was found both for all SA periods and,
albeit slightly weaker, for unrelated periods of SA. These findings
indicate that persons with an exclusion added to their insurance
policy have a higher than average risk of SA.
Strengths and limitations
One of the strengths of our study was the use of registers from an
insurance company providing us with data on self-employed, a
population that is otherwise difficult to study. Additionally the
study relies on registered data on SA from insurance company
files, thus avoiding recall-bias. As we only included SA periods of
30 days or longer, absenteeism caused by minor ailments is not
included in our analysis, which has inflated median duration of all
SA periods.
Regarding the limitations, there may have been underreporting of
SA periods related to the exclusions in the groups that have an
exclusion added to their insurance contract. Although the insured
persons in our sample are obliged to report all SA periods, they may
not have taken the trouble to do this when no benefit would be paid.
However, the groups that with exclusion also experienced more and
longer periods of SA in comparison to those who had never had an
exclusion when absence unrelated to the exclusions was examined.
A final limitation relates to whether our study results are gener-
alizable to other populations. Our study sample consisted of higher
educated self-employed with a private disability policy only. Also,
only clients from one insurance company were studied. Some
caution must, therefore, be applied as to whether our findings are
transferable to other populations and to other forms of insurance
that rely on health-related risk selection.
Exclusions added to the insurance policy may be an indication of
a generally poorer health leading to more and longer SA periods.
Wildhagen et al.11 found insured persons with exclusions to have
more health complaints, both related and unrelated to the
exclusions. Multimorbidity, the co-occurrence of more than one
disease or condition, is common, even among working-age
individuals.15 The elevated risk of SA is probably not just caused
by a single condition leading to an exclusion but related to the
overall health status including complications of disease and to
shared risk factors. We specifically analysed periods of SA that
were unrelated to an exclusion present during that period to
examine whether the higher risks could be caused by the specific
condition that led to the exclusion. In these analyses, it was still
found that persons with an exclusion had a higher hazard for
experiencing a new period of SA and had on average more sick
days. This indicates that the exclusions do not fully neutralize the
elevated risk of SA.
Data on the two groups whose exclusions ran for part of the
follow-up were also analysed (group C and group D). These
groups had a higher hazard of SA than the reference group (A)
but other results regarding these groups are difficult to interpret,
possibly because of distinct selection mechanisms as exclusions can
only be added to additional insurance policies and not to existing
policies.
Our results differ from Hamilton’s findings12 but are in part in
keeping with Wildhagen’s study.11 In addition to Wildhagen’s
finding that there was a higher risk of experiencing SA periods, we
also found the SA periods to be longer in duration. Our additional
findings may be caused by our larger sample and the greater detail in
which we studied SA and exclusions. Also our design differed from
these two case-control studies that may have been more affected by
confounding or selection bias.
Another possible explanation for the higher hazard of periods of
SA could be the scarring effect of previous SA periods as is described
for depressive episodes.16 Conditions causing previous SA periods
may lead to exclusions but the experience of SA itself regardless of
the cause may increase the hazard of SA too. This may explain our
finding of the highest hazard of SA periods for the group that had an
exclusion added after start follow-up (D). Vulnerability of these
persons is relevant for the risk evaluation by insurance companies.
Solidarity is an important aspect of insurance. However, the
question in what way the costs of the insurance have to be shared
is more difficult to answer. The basic principle that underlies all
insurance products is that premiums paid are proportional to the
risk of a future claim.4
Insurance can lead to solidarity but also to inequality and
exclusion.3 Differentiating risk groups according to their medical
situation can also be seen as discrimination. The United Nations
Table 4 Hazard rates and total duration of SA for SA periods unrelated to the exclusions only
SA unrelated to exclusion HR SA unrelated 95% CI HR SA unrelated 95% CI
Unadjusted Adjusteda,
Group A 1 1
Group B 1.17 1.08–1.28 1.09 1.00–1.18
Group C 1.15 1.00–1.33 1.13 0.98–1.30
Group D 1.44 1.28–1.62 1.44 1.28–1.62
Duration SA unrelated 95% CI Duration SA unrelated 95% CI
Unadjusted Adjusted
Group A 174.65 162.44–185.19 385.13 279.39–419.73
Group B 221.22 189.30–255.00 392.54 277.39–427.67
Group C 207.61 127.54–294.58 415.79 273.38–493.27
Group D 86.11 42.83–133.20 324.68 206.55–375.91
Group A: never exclusion (reference group).
Group B: exclusion whole follow-up.
Group C: exclusion from start but ended.
Group D: exclusion added after start follow-up.
SA, sickness absence; CI, confidence interval. aAdjusted for gender, occupation, age at start follow-up. Overall P values < 0.001. Overall P
values = 0.124.
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General Assembly adopted a convention on this issue in 2006. In this
convention, it is stated that persons with health problems are
entitled to the full spectrum of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, including access to financial services such as insurance,
without discrimination.17 The European Commission has given this
subject attention as well, with a proposed Directive to limit the use
of risk factors related to disability, and in particular to a disability’s
underlying health condition, in insurance and other financial
services.18
The use of exclusions affects the extent of insurance coverage for
a subgroup of insured self-employed. The results from our study in-
dicate that although persons with risk factors and health conditions
that lead to exclusions individually may feel discriminated against,
this system still allows for a certain solidarity with persons in poorer
health. Persons with an exclusion had a higher hazard of new periods
of SA and more sick days, also for SA unrelated to the exclusion.
Greater solidarity between the different risk groups could improve
accessibility of disability insurance but may also lead to higher
overall premiums.
Conclusions
The results of this study show that the SA risk of insured persons with
exclusions added to their insurance contract is higher than the risk of
those without exclusions. This was found both for all periods of SA
and for SA unrelated to the exclusions. The question to what extent an
individual should benefit from being less vulnerable to disease and SA
must be addressed in a larger societal context, taking other aspects of
health inequality and solidarity into account as well.
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Key points
 Exclusions are used by insurers to neutralize higher than
average risks of SA.
 Differentiating risk groups according to one’s medical
situation can be seen as discrimination against people with
health conditions.
 The SA risk of insured persons with exclusions added to
their insurance contract is higher than the risk of those
without exclusions.
 The question to what extent an individual should benefit
from being less vulnerable to disease and SA must be
addressed in a larger societal context, taking other aspects
of health inequality and solidarity into account as well.
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Objectives: To identify subgroups of disability retirees with different pre-retirement sickness allowance histories
and to examine whether the diagnosis of disability pension and socio-demographic variables discriminate these
subgroups. Methods: The data included all Finnish residents aged 30–64 years who were granted a full disability
pension in 2011 (N=17 208). Sickness allowance trajectories during the preceding 10 years were searched using
latent trajectory analysis. Multinomial logistic regression analysis was used to explore determinants of the
trajectories. Results: Six distinct sickness allowance trajectories were identified. Four large subgroups with a
long sickness allowance period during the final pre-retirement year were found, characterized by increasing
(29% of retirees), early high (21%), stable low (24%) or stable high (16%) sickness allowance histories. In
addition, two small subgroups (6 and 4%) with only a little sickness allowance during the final year were
identified. The diagnosis of disability pension strongly influenced assignment to the trajectory groups. Women
were more likely to have followed the stable high or the early high sickness allowance trajectory. Older age
strongly increased but being a lower non-manual employee or self-employed decreased the probability of
belonging to the two small trajectory groups. Long-term unemployment slightly increased belonging to the
stable low trajectory and was strongly associated with the small subgroups with little or no sickness allowance
during the final year preceding retirement. Conclusions: Different pre-retirement sickness allowance trajectories
can be found. Assignment to the trajectories differed by the diagnosis of disability pension but associations with
socio-demographic variables were weak.
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Introduction
In most developed countries, disability benefits constitute ofsickness allowance that compensates for short-term work
disability and disability pension granted after longer or permanent
work incapacity.1 Most of those who retire due to disability first
receive sickness allowance. This is the case also in Finland, where
disability pension is normally granted after a sickness allowance
period lasting 1 year.2 However, the receipt of sickness allowance
predicts disability retirement also on longer term.3–10 Longer length
of sickness allowance increases the risk of disability retirement and
the strength of the association also varies by diagnosis of sickness
allowance and socio-demographic variables.7–9 Yet, little is known
about the development of sickness allowance histories before
disability retirement. On average, sickness allowance days increase
when disability retirement approaches11,12 but there may be different
subgroups that do not follow a similar pattern. The aim of this study
was to identify subgroups of disability retirees with different pre-
retirement sickness allowance trajectories and to examine whether
the diagnosis of the disability pension and socio-demographic
variables discriminate these trajectories.
Methods
The data included all Finnish residents who had been granted a new
full-time disability pension in 2011, identified from the registers of
the Social Insurance Institution of Finland (flat-rate national
pensions) and the Finnish Centre for Pensions (earnings-related
pensions). To permit sufficient time for tracing back the pre-
retirement sickness allowance histories, those younger than 30
years were excluded. The data thus included 17 208 disability
retirees.
Sickness allowance
Data on sickness allowance were based on the register of the Social
Insurance Institution. The register includes all sickness allowance
periods that exceed a waiting period which normally consists of 10
working days. For those who have not been engaged in any gainful
activities during the preceding 3 months, the waiting period is 55
days.13 The number of sickness allowance days was examined in 1-
year (365 days) intervals counting backwards from the start of the
pension. The length of each sickness allowance period was calculated
as the difference between the last and the first allowance day.
Covariates
The primary diagnosis of the disability pension was classified into
eight groups based on the ICD-10 classification. The categories were
depression (F32-F33), other mental and behavioural disorders
(other illnesses in Chapter F), back problems (M40-M54), other
musculoskeletal disorders (other illnesses in Chapter M), diseases
of the circulatory system (I00-I99), neoplasms (C00-D48), diseases
of the nervous system (G00-G99), injury (S00-T98) and all other
illnesses.
Age at the end of 2010 was classified into 30–44, 45–54 and 55–64
years. Educational level was derived from Statistics Finland and
classified into those with primary education, lower-secondary,
upper-secondary and tertiary education. Social class was derived
by first separating wage earners and self-employed based on the
type of their employment insurance. Wage earners were then
classified into manual workers, lower non-manual employees and
upper non-manual employees.14 Unemployment history was
classified into <90 days, more than 90 days and entire year during
any 1-year interval during the preceding 6 years.
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